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Abstract
This paper examines monetary policy from an optimal control perspective. Five loss
functions arc minimized for each of five models, and the results are compared. The basic
(‘true’) loss function targets inRation and unemployment. The other loss functions target,
respectively, i&l&ion alone, unemployment alone, nominal growth alone, and real growth
alone. The five models are fvfo small ~trwtural models, two VAR models, and a large
structural model. A numerical procedure is presented that c&o handle a variety of loss
functions and models.
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1. Iotwduction
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best

monetary

policy rule for the Federal Reserve.’
The general approach
in this literature
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to I) choose a policy instrument
usually the monetay
base, Ml, M2, or a
short-term

interest

rate,
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and a rule, and 3) examine,
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under
typically
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target variable from its target value. Usually the actual values of the variances
of key macroeconomic variables like the real growth rate and the rate of infktion are compared to the values of the variances that would have occurred had
the rule been followed. The aim is to find the rule (including the choice of the
target variable) that gives (in some sense) the best overall performance of the
eclXKltlly.
The general question of determining the best monetary policy rule of the Fed
is an obvious one to examine using optimal control techniques, but with the
exception of Feldstein and Stock (1993), the literature has not been concerned
with solving optimal control problems and deriving optimal monetary policy rules.
In this paper we examine monetary policy from an optimal control perspective.
Our general procedure is as follows.
First, we choose a particular loss function and awune that everyone (including
the Fed) agrees that this is the loss function whose expected value the Fed should
minimize. Call this the ‘true’ loss function. Second, we choose a policy instrument
and use this instrument to minimize the expected value of the true loss function.
Third, we use the instrument to minimize the expected value of other, simpler
loss functions (such as one that targets only nominal GDP). Finally, we compare
the different outcomes to see how close the minimization
of the expected value
of the simpler loss functions comes to the minimization
of the expected value
of the true loss function. We also compare the outcomes to the actual, historical
outcome to see how much better the economic performance would have been had
the Fed behaved by minimizing the expected value of the particular loss function
in question. We use five different models for these results: two small structural
models, two VAR models, and a large structural model. The policy instrument
for one of the small structural models and for one of the VAR models is the
money supply (M2), and the policy instrument for the other three models is the
three-month Treasuy bill rate. The VAR models are essentially two versions of
the same model, one with an equation for the money supply and one with an
equation for the bill rate.
Our results allow us to examine how much is lost by targeting, for example,
only nominal GDP. If the results of minimizing the expected value of the loss
function that targets only nominal GDP are close to the results of minimizing the
expected value of the true loss function, then the recommendation
some studies
have made that only nominal GDP should be targeted may be worth considering
on grounds of simplicity. If, on the other hand, the results are not close, then the
recommendation
should probably be rejected. The same holds for targeting only
real GDP, only inflation, and only unemployment.
The control period is 1962: l-1993:2 (126 quarters). The target value for each
of the various target variables in the loss functions is taken to be the mean of
the actual values of the variable over the control period. The focus in this paper.
as in much of the literature, is on variances and not means, and having the target
values be the mean values is a way of eliminating mean effects.

The loss functions and control problems are discussed in Section 2, and the
procedure for solving the control problems is explained in Section 3. The models
are then discussed in Sections 4, 5, and 6, and the results are presented in Section
7. Finally, Section 8 discusses how stochastic simulation might be used in future
work, and Section 9 concludes with some other suggestions for future research.
Before proceeding, it should be noted that the optima1 control approach is not
without criticism. Some have argued that monetary policy rules should be robust
in the sense of working well across a variety of models. This may not be true
of a role derived by minimizing
the expected value of a loss function using
a particular model, since the rule is obviously model-specific.
The robustness
\
property would be a good one if the models in question were all equally likely
of being the best approximation
of the economy. If, however, all models but,
say, one were poor approximations,
one would want to find a rule that worked
well on the good model regardless of how it worked on the other models.
The literature to date has worked with very small models, and it does not seem
likely that any of them is a good approximation.
The large s~~chual model considered in this paper has been extensively tested, and it seems (to us) to be much
more likely to be a good approximation
than are the other four models considered here and similar models in the literature. We thus put much more weight in
this paper on the results using the large model, and we are not concerned with
how the (implicit) rule for the large model might work for the small models.
The main reason for including the results for the small models in this paper is to
have a reference point to the previous literature, which, as just noted, has only
been concerned with small models.
Another criticism of the optimal control approach is that it is time-inconsistent
if expectations are rational. This is, of course, a problem for any rule, not just a
rule derived from the solution of an optimal control problem. Some precommitment technology is needed to avoid this problem, and this is true whether the
rule is optimal or whether it is chosen in some other way.
Finally, the work in this paper is based on the assumption that the parameters
of the models do not change as policy rules change. Regarding the large model, it
is argued in Fair (1994) that if changing policy rules cause important parameter
changes, the model should not do well in the various tests that were performed
on it. The model in fact does reasonably well in the tests.

2. The loss functions and control problems
Let X, denote the log of nominal GDP, Y, the log of real GDP, and P, the log
of the GDP price index, where X, = P, + Yr and where the t subscript refers to
period f.’ Denote the growth rates as: XI =400(X,-X,+,),
y, = 4OO(Y, - Y,_,),
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and pI = 4OO(P, ~ Pt_,). The differences are multiplied by 400 to put the
growth rates at annual rates in percentage points. Let U{ denote the level of the
unemployment
rate, and let x*, y*, p*, and U* denote the target values of x,, y,,
pi, and U,, respectively, where, as noted above, the target values are the means
of the historical values over the control period. Finally, let Lit be the loss in
period t associated with variable j deviating from its target, where j is either I,
JJ, p, or U. Lj, is postulated to be
L,,, = (ji ~ j’ )‘.

(I)

As noted in the Introduction, we consider two policy instruments in this paper,
M2 and the three-month Treasury bill rate. Let Mi denote the log of M2, and let
m, denote its growth rate: m, = 4OO(M, ~ MT_,). Let R, denote the level of the
three-month Treasury bill rate. In the following analysis we will use a measure
of the cost associated with changing the policy instrument. The cost in period t,
denoted D,,, where z is either m or R, is postulated to be
DZi = (it - zt-,)*.

(2)

When m is the policy instrument,
Hr = O.SL,,, + OSLO, + zDmr +

the ‘true’ loss in period t is postulated
0.1
m; + 2.001

+

to be

0.1
21.001

m:’

(3)

where m; is equal to ml if m, is greater than -2.0 and to -2.0 otherwise and
m; is equal to m, if m, is less than 21.0 and to 21.0 otherwise. When R is the
policy instrument, the ‘true’ loss in period t is postulated to he
Hr = OSL,, + OSL,

+ nDRi +

0.1

0.1

R; - 1.999 + 16.001 -R;’

(4)

where R, is equal to R, if R, is greater than 2.0 and to 2.0 otherwise and R; is
equal to R, if R, is less than 16.0 and to 16.0 otherwise.
The third, fourth, and fifth terms in Eqs. (3) and (4) require some explanation.
Consider first the third term, and assume that the control period of interest is
I through 7. For each control problem solved in this paper we have chosen
a so that the value of c:i,Dzr
using the optimal values of z is close to the
value using the historical values of z (where z is either m or R). We have
thus constrained the problem so that the period-to-period
variation in the policy
instrument as measured by C:=, Dzr is roughly the same in the optimal solution
as it is historically. We are taking the actual value of C:=, Dzl as the maximum
amount of variation in the policy instrument that the Fed allows, and we are
thus constraining
each solution to have roughly no more variation than this.
Without this type of constraint, the solutions sometimes have huge period-toperiod changes in the policy instrument, and it is not sensible to think that the

Fed would ever behave in this extreme way. The Fed undoubtedly assigns coots
to changing policy instruments, which is what our treatment is doing.
The fourth and fifth terms in Eq. (3) insure that the optimal values of m will be
between -2.0 and 21.0. The range of m in the control period is - 1.34 to 20.34,
and so the fourth and fifth terms keep m roughly within its historical range. We
are taking this range to be the maximum that the Fed allows. Similarly, the fourth
and fifth terms in Eq. (4) insure that the optimal values of R will be between
2.0 and 16.0. The range of R in the control period is 2.72 to 15.09, and so the
fourth and fifth terms keep R roughly within its historical range.
The main feature of Eqs. (3) and (4) is that we are taking the true loss to be ’
deviations of unemployment
and inflation from their targets. The Fed is assumed
in the final analysis to care only about these two variables (except for the cost
of changing the policy instroment). As an approximation.
this does not seem an
unreasonable assumption, but it would be easy in future work to have the true loss
depend on more variables. We do need, however, to make some assumption about
the true loss in order to have a basis for comparison of alternative policy rules.
The other loss timctions tried are one that targets only inflation [the first two
terms in (3) and (4) replaced by L,,], one that targets only unemployment
[the
first rwo terms in (3) and (4) replaced by &], one that targets only nominal
growth [the first two terms in (3) and (4) replaced by L,,], and one that targets
only real growth [the first two terms in (3) and (4) replaced by L,,,].
As noted above, the control period of interest is 1 through T, where I is 1962:l
and T is 1993:2. However, in order not to have to assume that life ends in T, the
control problem should be thought of as one of minimizing the expected value of
Cf=$ Hi. where n is chosen to be large enough to avoid unusual end-of-horizon
effects near T. The overall control problem should thus be thought of as choosing
the values of m or R that minimize the expected value of C:y,n~,
subject to
the model used.
3. The solution

procedure

If a model is linear and the objeaive tin&m
quadratic, it is possible to derive
analytically
optimal feedback equations for the control variables.’ In general,
however, optimal feedback equations cannot be derived for nonlinear models
or for objective functions with nonlinear constraints on the instruments,
and a
numerical procedure must be used. The following procedure was used for the
results in this paper. It is based on a sequence of solutions of deterministic
control problems.
The aim is to approximate the T values of z, denoted z;,
,zf, that would
have been chosen had it been possible to derive analytically an optimal feedback

equation for z. Given information at the beginning of period 1, the overall optimal
control problem is to minimize the expected value of C:=:“H,
subject to the
model. As noted above, although n is used here to avoid end-of-horizon problems,
in the final analysis we are only interested in the values of the control variable
through T.
For purposes of solving the control problems, the Fed is assumed to know the
model (its structure and coefficient estimates). This is more than the Fed would
have known historically because the model was developed after the first quarter
of the control period and is estimated through the end of the control period.
On the other hand, the Fed is assumed not to know the future values of any
endogenous variable, any exogenous variable, or any error term when solving
the control problems. The optimal path of z is something the Fed could have
achieved had it had knowledge of the model.
The procedure

for solving the overall control

problem

is as follows:

1. If the model has exogenous variables, which the large stmctural model considered in this paper has, add estimated autoregressive
exogenous-variable
equations to the model, so that the model has in effect no exogenous variables. [For the large structural model this is Model US+ in Fair (1994).]
Set all the error terms to zero (their expected values), including the errors
in the exogenous-variable
equations, for periods 1 through k, where k is the
length of the horizon for the first solution. Choose values of z for periods I
through k that minimize C:_, Hz subject to the model with the error terms
set to zero. This is just a deterministic optimal control problem, which can
be solved, for example, by the method in Fair (1974).4 Let 2; denote the
optimal value of z for period 1 that results from this solution. The value
of k should be chosen to be large enough so that making it larger has a
negligible effect on 2;. zf is a value that the Fed could have computed at the
beginning of period I (assuming the model were known) having knowledge
of the endogenous-variable
values, the exogenous-variable
values, and the
error terms only up to, but not including, period l.5
2. Drop the exogenous-variable
equations, and set the error terms in the structural equations for period 1 equal to their historical values. Solve this version

of the model for period 1 using zf instead of its actual value and using the
actual values of all the other exogenous variables. (This is just a deterministic simulation for period 1.) The solution values from this simulation are
what the model estimates would have occurred historically in period 1 had
the Fed chosen z; and had the exogenous-variable
values and error terms
been what they were historically.
3. Repeat steps 1 and 2 for periods 2 through T. For an arbitrary period S, use
the solution values of all endogenous variables for periods s - I and back,
as well as the values of z,‘_, and back.
The solution values of the endogenous variables carried along from period to
period in the above procedure are estimates of what the economy would have
been like had the Fed chosen z;,
,z; and had the exogenous-variable
values
and error terms been what they were historically. Given knowledge of the model,
these are values that the Fed could have achieved. Note that once z;, _. ,z; are
chosen, the solution values for periods 1 through T can be generated all at once.
This can be done by 1) dropping the exogenous-variable
equations, 2) setting
the structural error terms to their historical values, 3) using the actual values of
all the exogenous variables (except z), 4) using z;... .,z;, and then 5) solving
the model for periods 1 through T. These are the values referred to below as
‘solution values’. Note that these values are not the Fed’s expected values after it
has made its decision each period. The Fed’s expected values are based on the use
of the exogenous-variable
equations and zero values of the error terms, whereas
the solution values are based on the actual values of the exogenous variables
(except the policy instrument)
and error terms. The results of minimizing
the
expected value of each of the five loss functions for each of the five models are
presented in Table 1 later in the article.

4. Two small struchual
Money

instrument

models

Model S(m)

Model S(m) consists of a simple aggregate demand equation,6 a Phillips curve,
a variant of Okun’s law, and the identity relating x,, yi, and P,:
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The estimated system, using the sample period 1960:1&1993:2, is shown below.
Parameter estimates were obtained by the method of iterated three-stage least
squares (3SLS) with the predetermined
variables x,+,, m,_,, PI+,. ~1-2, JJ_-~,
Uti,,, and UC+2 as instrumental
variables for the second and third equations.
(Absolute values of t-statistics arc given in parentheses.)
J, =3.00+0.190~,~,
(3.65) (2.38)
SE = 3.62,

p, = 1.65 +0.479&1
(3.85) (5.94)
SE = 1.19,

+0.425m,_l,
(4.55)

(9)

D w = 2.06,
+ O.l65p,+z
(1.85)

+0.321~,+3
(3.93)

~ 0.2430;,
(3.37)

(IO)

DW = 2.00,

L: - b;:,, =0.355 + 0.335U,+,
(5.12)
(4.68)

- 0.362U+2
(4.94)

DW

SE = 0.19,

~ O.O44y, - O.Ol5y,_l,
(4.11)
(2.67)

(11)

= 2.06.

Several properties of this system should be noted. First, the estimated system is
dynamically stable in the variables n, p, and U, with characteristic roots 0.958 1!t
O.l072i, -0.2514 + 0.3139i, 0.3779, and 0.1896. Second, the data do not reject
the accelerationist form of the Phillips curve (p2 + p3 + fi_~= I), with a x2 value
of 0.59 (p-value
= 0.44), but do reject the growth-rate form of Okun’s law
(y4 = -ys), with a x2 value of 5.97 (p-value = 0.01).
The mean of the vector (x p U) as a function of the mean of m is given by
(~)=(~;z)+jiEK$

(12)

from this that a one percentage point
supply will in the long run increase the
growth rate of real output by 0.03 percentage points (0.52-0.49)
and decrease the
unemployment
rate by 0.07 percentage points. The model thus exhibits modest
monetary nonneutrality
in the long nm.
As for all the models, the results for Model S(m) are based on the solution of
126 deterministic optimal control problems for each of the five loss fun&xx.
The
value of k used for the optimizations for the four small models was 16 quarters.
The value of I( in Eqs. (3) and (4) that was used for Model S(m) was 0.015. All
the calculations for the four small models were done using the RATS program.

where

fi denotes

the mean.

It follows

increasein the growth rate of the money

Interest

rate instrument - Model

S(R)

Model S(R) is the same as Model S(m) except that Eq. (5) is replaced by
y, = x, + az.k-1 + vR,-,

+ Gil.

(13)
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The same procedures were used for Model S(R) as were used for Model S(m).
The predetermined
variables _I+,. &I,
P,-,, .P-?, pI_,: UC_,, and G-2 were
used as instmmental variables for Eqs. (6) and (7). The estimated system, using
the sample period 1954:lkl993:2,
is
J+ = 3.77 + 0.283?;,_,
(5.36) (3.X5)
sl? = 3.83,

- 0.288R,_,,
(2.87)

DW

(14)

= 2.09,

p,= 1.45+ 0.429p,_, + 0.2OOp,_2 + 0.282+3
(2.50)
(3.30) (5.72)
(3.71)
SE = 1.34,

DW

- 0.174'.&
(2.30)

(15)

= 1.84,

r;,- o;_i =0.495 + 0.332ci,_,~ 0.368(/,_2- 0.084yr- O.O07y,_,,
(7.08) (5.50)
(1.09)
(5.80)
(6.76)
SE = 0.25,

DW

(16)

= 2.18.

The characteristic roots are 0.9510,0.9416.
which indicate that the model is stable.
curve is rejected at the 0.10 but not the
value = 0.06). The growth-rate form of
of 7.45 (p-value = 0.01). The mean of
mean of R is given by

~0.2612+0.4783i,
0.3910, and 0.2834,
The accelerationist
form of the Phillips
0.05 level, with a ;I’ value of 3.41 (pOkun’s law is rejected, with a ;r’ value
the vector (JJ p L’) as a function of the

The value of I used was 0.250.

5. Two VAR

models

Model V(nt) consists of four equations, one each for x, p. LT. and R, where
the right-hand-side variables consist of a constant and three lags each of x_ p, U,
R, and m. The same sample periods and procedures were used here as were used
above except that the estimation technique was ordiway least squares instead of
3SLS. The value of I used was 0.015.
Interestrate instrument- Model Y(R)

Model V(X) is the same as Model V(m) except that the equation for R is
replaced by an equation for m. The right-hand-side
variables are the same, and

6. A large structural

model - Model L(R)

Model L(R) is presented in Fair (1994). It is quarterly and consists of 30
stochastic equations and 101 identities. It was estimated by two-stage least squares
over the 1954:1-1993:2
period. The following is a brief discussion
of the
properties of the model that are relevant for present purposes.’ Remember that
the model is based on the assumption that expectations are not rational and the
assumption that the parameters of the stmctural equations do not change when
policy rules change.
There are six sectors in the model: household, firm, financial, foreign, state
and local government, and federal government.
All the flows of funds among
these sectors and all balance-sheet
constraints are accounted for in the model.
This is done by linking the national income and product accounts and the flow
of funds accounts. The sum of the savings across the six sectors is zero; some
sector’s expense is some other sector’s revenue. Also, one sector’s financial asset
is some other sector’s financial liability. Accounting for all flows of funds means
that there is an explicit Fed open market operations variable in the model, the
amount of federal government securities outstanding. This is the main ‘tool’ of the
Fed. The other two tools are the resewe requirement rate and the discount rate.
The basic version of the model includes an interest rate reaction function of
the Fed, which is estimated. This is the monetary policy rule that the Fed is
estimated to have followed over the period. The three-month Treasury bill rate is
OD the left-hand side of this equation and variables that are assumed to affect Fed
behavior are on the right-hand side. In this version of the model the money supply
is endogenous; the Fed through open market operations each quarter achieves the
bill rate implied by this equation.
Two term structure equations in the model link the bill rate to two longterm interest rates, a bond rate and a mortgage rate, where the long rates are a
function of the current and lagged bill rates. The bill rate thus affects long-tam
rates through these term structure equations.
There are four household expenditure
equations in the model, explaining
1) consumption of services, 2) consumption of nondurables, 3) consumption of
durables, and 4) residential investment. There is also an import equation. Interest
rates appear as explanatory variables in these equations
the bill rate in the
services equation and the mortgage rate in the others. (The bill rate is taken
as a proxy for short-term rates in general, and the mortgage rate is taken as a
proxy for long-term rates in general.) The coefficient estimates of the interest rate
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variables are all negative (and significant except in the import equation). There
is also a nonresidential
fixed investment equation in the model, and the bond
rate appears in this equation with a negative and significant coefficient estimate.
Therefore, through this part of the specification a decrease in interest rates increases household expenditures and nonresidential fixed investment and increases
imports. The increase in imports is not large enough to offset the other increases,
so that through this part of the specification there is a net increase in the demand
for domestic goods in the model when interest rates fall.
The bond rate also appears in a stock price equation, where a decrease in the
bond rate has a positive effect on stock prices. The value of stocks is part of
household wealth, and household wealth (lagged once) appears as an explanatory variable in two of the four household expenditure equations with positive
estimated coefficients. A decrease in interest rates thus has a positive effect on
household expenditures through stock prices.
Disposable income appears in the household expenditure equations and in the
import equation. The net effect of an increase in disposable income on the demand
for domestic goods is positive - the positive effect from the expenditure equations
outweighs the negative effect from the import equation. Since interest receipts of
households arc part of income, a decrease in interest rates (and thus interest
receipts) has a negative effect on income and thus on demand through this part
of the specification. This negative effect is not large enough to offset completely
the positive effects discussed above, and the total effect on output from a fall in
interest rates is positive.
The following is a summary of how a decrease
economy according to the model:
I. Long-term

in the bill rate affects the

rates fall over time through the term structure

2. Stock prices rise, which is a rise in household

equations.

wealth.

3. Interest payments of the federal government fall, which leads to a fall in
interest receipts of the household sector and thus, other things being equal,
household income.
4. The fall in interest rates and rise in wealth have a positive effect on expenditures on domestic goods, and the fall in income from the fall in interest
receipts has a negative effect. The net effect is positive.
The price level is a nonlinear function of, among other things, the difference
behveen potential output and actual output, a measure of demand pressure. As
output approaches 4 percent above potential, the price level approaches infinity.
The price of imports also has an important effect on the domestic price level.
The unemployment
rate is determined as one minus the ratio of employment
to the labor force. There are three labor force participation
equations for the
household sector, one for each of three agcsex groups, that determine the labor

184
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force, and there is a demand for labor equation for the firm sector that determines
most of employment.
When the optimal control problems were solved, the estimated interest rate
reaction function of the Fed was dropped from the model, and the interest rate
determined by this equation (the three-month Treasury bill rate) was taken to be
the control variable, i.e., the policy instnunent.
This means that the open market
operations variable of the Fed, the amount of government securities outstanding,
is endogenous; its value each quarter is whatever is needed to achieve the desired
value of the bill rate.
The solution of the 126 deterministic optimal control problems for each loss
function took about 12 hours on a Pentium 90 computer for Model L(R). To
save computer time, the value of k used for the optimizations was taken to be 8
quarters instead of 16 quarters used for the small models. Some experimentation
suggested that a value of k of 8 was large enough for the addition of more
quarters to have a fairly small effect on the optimal value of R for the first
quarter. The value of c( used was 0.500. All the calculations for the model were
done using the Fair-Parke program.
7. Discussion

of the results

The results are presented in Table 1. Consider first the values in the ‘Actual’
row versus the values obtained by minimizing the expected value of the true loss
function, which are in the first nxv for each model. Remember that the true loss
function weights inflation and unemployment
equally. When the expected value
of this loss function is minimized for Model L(R), the unemployment
loss (Qu)
falls from 1.59 to 0.92, but the inflation loss (Qp) actually rises (from 2.41 to
2.62). The other four models have both inflation loss and unemployment
loss
falling. Model S(R) is closest to Model L,(R) in that the fall in the inflation loss
is small relative to the fall in the unemployment
loss.
Consider next how tlx policy of targeting only nominal growth (x) does compared to the policy of minimizing the expected value of the true loss function.x
For Model L(R) the increase in Qp.cr when only nominal growth is targeted is
16.3 percent (from I.Y6 to 2.28). The other percentage increases are 12.6 for
Model S(m), 3.8 for Model S(R), 10.8 for Model V(m), and 13.0 for Model
V(R). All models except S(R) thus show a noticeable increase in loss when only
nominal growth is targeted, with the largest increase for L(R).
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The policy of targeting only inflation (p) works well for the four small models
in that for each model the value of Q,,,r: when only p is targeted is fairly close
to the value when the true loss function is minimized. This is not true, however;
for L(R). Conversely, the policy of targeting only unemployment
(U) works well
for L(R) in that the value of Q,,.r: when only U is targeted is fairly close to the
value when the true loss function is minimized, but this is not true for the four
small models. The policy of targeting only real growth ( y) does not work well
for any model.
There is one odd result in Table 1 that should bc noted before proceeding
further. When only U is targeted using Model V(m), QU actually increases (from
1.59 to 1.65). In this model nz has little a&t on L’, and when only U is targeted,
the value of m tends to go close to one of the bounds implied by the penalty
terms in the loss function and to stay there for many periods. The penalty terms
are in effect dominating the results9 The fact that m has little atl’ect on U in
Table 1
Results For the five mudelv and fire Iws functiuns
QP,D

QP

Qti

a

Qy

C;,

CR

z*

2.04

2.41

1.59

3.91

3.93

2.72

0.89

~

True 106stilnct.

l.67

2.03

1.21

4.22

4.49

2.70

~

“.OlS

Target only p

1.76

1.85

1.66

4.66

5.35

3.27

Target only ”

2.36

3.27

0.67

4.78

3.95

2.32

-

0.015

Target only x

1.88

2.00

1.67

3.50

3.62

0.34

~

0.015

Target only y

2.68

3.68

0.91

4.64

3.39

1.07

True loss funcr.

1.83

2.34

1.09

4.07

4.02

~

0.86

0.250

Target Only p

1.84

2.10

1.53

3.94

4.22

--

I .08

0.2511

Target only u

2.03

2.74

0.88

4.34

3.86

~

0.77

0.250

?arget oniy x

1.90

2.05

1.73

3.79

4.08

-

0.95

0.25”

Target only )

2.59

3.31

1.57

4.66

3.65

~

0.25

0.250

True loss funci.

1.48

1.7”

1.21

3.91

4.25

2.13

-

0.015

Target oniy p

i .4Y

1.67

1.29

4.12

4.59

2.92

~

0.015

Target only L’

2.36

2.90

1.65

4.06

3.58

0.74

~

0.015

Target on@ I

1.64

1.85

1.41

3.37

3.63

2.53

Target Dilly y

2.76

3.52

1.68

4.19

3.39

2.88

Actual
Mndei S(m)

0.015

0.015

Model S(R)

.wJde, V(m )

0.015
~

0.015

Model V(m) can also be seen by comparing the results of minimizing the true
loss function to those of targeting only p. These two sets of results are very
close, which means that when the true loss function is being minimized, the only
action is in controlling p. not L’. Because of this feature of Model V(m), little
weight should be attached to the U results for this model.
Continuing with the results in Table I, it is possible to use them to examine the trade-off between unemployment
variability (&) and inflation variability
(QP), This trade-off is what Taylor (1979) calls a ‘second-order’ Phillips curve.
Table I provides three points on this curve for each model. The weights on U
and p are 0.5 and 0.5 for the true loss function, I.0 and 0.0 when only U is
targeted, and 0.0 and 1.0 when only p is targeted. Table 2 presents for each
model except V(m) the changes in QL~ and QP in going from zero weight on

inflation (targeting only U) to zero weight on unemployment
(targeting only p).
(Model V(m) is excluded for the reasons discussed above.) For Model L(R) there
is a 1.27 drop in unemployment
variability at a cost of a 0.38 rise in inflation
variability, a trade-off of 3.3 to 1 (1.27/0.38). The smallest trade-off is for Model
S(m) of 0.7 to 1 (0.9911.42). The trade-offs for the other two models are about
1 to 1.
As mentioned in the Introduction, we are inclined to put more weight on the
results for Model L(R) because it is likely to be more accurate. One of the main
differences between L(R) and the small models concerns the trade-off between
unemployment
variability and inflation variability. The trade-off is much higher
for L(R)
3.3 to 1 - than for the small models - about 1 to 1. Two other
differences are that targeting inflation works fairly well for the small models, but
works fairly well for L(R), but not
not for L(R), and targeting unemployment
for the small models. Two similarities are that targeting nominal growth does not
work very well (except for Model S(R)) and targeting real growth does not work
well. This first similarity suggests that the widely held view in the literature that
targeting nominal growth is a good idea may not be right.
Further

details

The figures in Table 1 hide many of the details of the results, and it is of
interest to consider a few of these details. Fig. 1 shows plots of the actual and
solution (hatted) values of p and U for Model S(R), along with the achxd
and optimal values of R. The optimal and solution values are from the results
of minimizing
the expected value of the true loss function. Fig. 2 shows the
same plots for Model L(R). For both models the optima correspond to higher
unemployment
rates in the 1960s and lower unemployment
rates in the 1980s.
To achieve this, the bill rates are higher in the 1960s and generally lower in the
1980s. For L(R) there is little difference between the optimal and actual inflation
rates, whereas for S(R) the optimal inflation rates are generally higher than the
actual rates in the 1980s. These plots are, of course, consistent with the result in
Table 1 that unemployment
variability is lowered more than inflation variability

Actual and Optimal Values of R
AcChld
____Opkn~l

Actual and Optimal Values of U

12
-

ActM____ Optimal

ID

2

Actual and Optimal Values of p

12

Actual and Optimal Values of U
_

A.3u.l____OWmal

10

2

Actual and Optimal Values of p
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when the expected value of the true loss function is minimized for Models S(R)
and L(R).
Another way to look at optimal control results is to examine feedback
equations. For a linear model like S(R) and a quadratic objective function, the
coefficients in the feedback equation can be obtained (using the solution values
as data) by regressing the value of the policy instrument (R) on its lagged value
and on ~~-1, pi_,. ~~-2, ~~~-3, U,_1, G-2, and a constant. These are the variables in the optimal feedback equation. If bounds are imposed on the instrument,
as is done here, the optimal feedback equation is no longer linear, and so the
regression is only approximate.
The regression using the solution values for Model S(R) for the minimization
of the expected value of the true loss function is
RI = 5.20 + O.O77y,+, + 0.234p,_,
-1.605&,

+ 0.747U,_z

+ 0.098~,_2

+ 0.048+3

+ 0.65lR,_1.

(18)

The fit of this regression is quite good (R* = 0.991), which suggests that the
approximation
is good. The coefficients on the y and p values show that the
interest rate responds positively to output growth and inflation. The unemployment
terms can be written - 0.858U,_, - 0.747(c5_1 -U-z),
and so the unemployment
coefficients show that the interest rate responds negatively to both the level and
change of the unemployment
rate. When Eq. (18) was used in place of solving
the 126 deterministic control problems, the value of QP;G was the same to two
decimal places as the value in Table 1 (1.X3), and so the equation is obviously
a good approximation to the true feedback equation.
What about a feedback equation for Model L(R)? The model is nonlinear, and
so even ignoring the penalty terms in the loss function, the feedback equation is
nonlinear. Also, there are over a hundred predetermined
variables in the model,
and so the feedback equation is huge. It may be, however, that, even though the
true feedback equation is nonlinear and large, a few right-hand-side
variables
provide a good approximation.
To check this, a number of regressions were run
(using the solution values as data) with the policy instrument (R) on the left-hand
side and various variables on the right-hand side. The aim was to tind variables
that contributed significantly
to the fit. The following, quite simple, equation
tuned out to give a good fit:
R, = 1.40 + 1.353R,_,
-0.0549(400Y,_z),

~ 0.387Rl_2

+ O.O544(4OOY,_,)
(19)

where Y is the log of real output. This regression has an R* of 0.980. This
equation roughly says that AR, = 1.4 i- 0.35~!.N+~ + 0.055~,-,,
where ~~-1,
the growth rate of real output in period t ~ 1, equals 400(Y,_i - K--?). This

rule simply says that change in the policy instrument depends positively on its
previous change and on the lagged real growth rate. Other variables, including lagged values of P and U, that were added to Eq. (19) tended not to be
significant. It may be with more diligent searching that other variables could
be found for inclusion in (19), but for present purposes we have stopped with
(19).
When Eq. (19) was used in place of solving the 126 deterministic
control
problems for model L(R), the value of Qr,cv was 2.03, which compares to the
optimal value of 1.96 in Table 1. The loss is thus 3.6 percent higher using (19).
This suggests that (19) is not a bad approximation,
and an argument might be
made for using it on grounds of simplicity On the other hand, the extra computer
cost in performing the complete optimization is trivial, and so the 3.6 percent
increase in loss could not be justified on computational
grounds. It is, however,
interesting that the simple equation does as well as it does, and this might be an
area for future work.

8. Stochastic

simulation

The variability measures in Table 1 do not require stochastic simulation
they
are based on the use of the historical shocks. Although for historical comparisons
these are the most appropriate shocks to use, it is interesting to consider how
alternative measures could be computed using stochastic simulation.
Consider the use of the above numerical procedure and Model L(R). There
are 29 stochastic equations in L(R), and the length of the control period is 126
quarters. The results in a given row in Table I for L(R) are thus based on
126x29 = 3654 historical error terms. (After each of the 126 solutions of the
deterministic control problem, 29 error terms are used.) A stochastic-simulation
alternative to the use of the historical error terms is as follows. 1) Using the
estimated distribution of the structural error terms, draw 29 error terms 126 times.
2) Go through the entire numerical procedure as above, using the drawn error
terms instead of the historical error terms. This yields a value of Qy for each
variable 4 (as in Table 1). 3) Do steps 1) and 2) J times, where J may be
around 100. This gives .J values of Q4, from which its mean, variance, and other
statistics can be computed. The means of Q4 would be alternatives to the values
in Table I, and they could be compared across loss functions.
What would correspond to the ‘Actual’ row in Table 1 when stochastic simulation was used’? The most obvious possibility for Model L(R) would be to
use the estimated interest rate reaction function discussed above as the monetary
policy rule. This is the rule the Fed is estimated to have followed historically. For
Model I’(R) it would be the estimated equation for R. Stochastic simulation is
easy to do numerically in this case because the rule replaces the need to compute
the optimal values of R. Each repetition involves solving the model with the rule

for the particular set of error terms drawn. ” The mean value of Qy from this
exercise could then be compared to the other mean values.
Since it takes about 12 hours of computer time to compute one value of Q,, for
Model L(R), computing, say, 100 values is not yet practical. One could. however,
experiment with smaller models at the present time, and computer chips are
getting faster. In the future it will be interesting to see if the conclusions reached
from Table I are sensitive to the use of stochastic simulation.
Finally, one could also draw coefficients as well as error terms for the stochastic
simulations. For each repetition (i.e., each draw of the 126x29 error terms) one
would draw a set of coefficients from an estimated distribution. The results with
and without drawing coeficients
could then be compared. This would be a way
of examining how robust the conclusions are to alternative versions of the model,
the alternative versions in this case being alternative sets of coefficients.

9. Conclusion
The conclusions from the results in Table I have been presented in Section 7;
and they will not be repeated here. The numerical procedure presented in Section
3 is general enough to handle a variety of loss functions and models. The loss
functions need not even be quadratic. Given that a number of the conclusions that
hold for Model L(R) do not hold for the small models, it would be of interest
in future work to try other models, particularly other large structural models.
The results in Fair (1994, pp. 32&328) suggest that monetary policy is becoming less effective for a given change in interest rates because of the growing size
of the federal government debt. Most of the debt is financed by the household
sector, and the larger is the debt, the larger is the change in interest revenue of
the household sector for a given change in interest rates. As noted in the discussion of Model L(R) in Section 6, a fall in interest revenue from a fall in interest
rates has, other things being equal, a negative effect on household expenditures,
and this offsets part of the other (positive) effects on expenditures of a decrease
in interest rates. The size of this offset is getting larger over time because of the
growing size of the government debt, and so on net monetary policy is becoming
less effective in the sense that there is a smaller change in output for a given
change in the interest rate. The less effective monetary policy becomes in this
sense, the less able will the Fed be to minimize any loss function that penalizes
changes in the interest rate. The Fed may thus do less well in the future.

R. C Fair,

E.P

F-li,wre~~iJournai

o/ .Mnnerury

Econnmiir 38 (IY%,i

173-193

193

Another issue that can be analyzed using the numerical procedure in Section
3 is targeting levels versus targeting growth rates in the loss function. (As noted
above, the loss function can be quite general.) One loss function might be squared
deviations of real output from some mcaswe of potential output, and another
might be squared deviations of the price level from a target price level that
grows at, say. one or two percent per year. In the process of writing this paper.
some early experimentation
ws done using these types of loss functions, but
for present purposes it was decided to stay with the loss functions in terms
of growth rates. An added complication
when using loss functions in levels is
pushing the economy into situations that are substantially
different from what
existed historically. In a model like L(R), this can have large cumulative etl’ects
and change both the real stock and financial stock variables substantially.
It is
always dangerous to push a model too far Tom historical experience. and using
loss functions in levels sometimes does this. At any rate, further experimentation
with alternative loss functions would be of interest. At a minimum, it might be
of interest to experiment with loss functions like (3) and (4) in which the target
values for Jo and U were not necessarily constant throughout the whole period.

